The development of integrated hardware-software system reliabili models is very difficult. This paper discusses some of the dizerences between hardware and software reliability modeling which make integrating them together so hard. It also discusses issues that are unique to each and common to both, and lists open problems that need to resolved.
INTRODUCTION
Pressures exist in the field of Digital Avionics that are leading to more and more use of embedded computer control systems in which software and hardware play e ually important roles. This means that the reliability of &e software is as important as the reliability of the hardware to the overall performance and reliability of the system. The effect of this is particularly significant to safety critical systems (such as some that may be found on commercial aircraft) and systems that may be inaccessible after deplo ment (such as spacecraft intended for deep space missions). k such systems, a realistic appraisal of the overall s stem reliabili hardware reliabili an2software relia ' 21 ility into account.
hardware reliability anal sis is performed. On the occasions considered, often a separate analysis is done for each. T x e are where both hardware reEability and software reliabili drawback here is that there are no widely accepted or standard methods for combining results of separate hardware and software reliability analyses together into a meaningful composite result. Ideally, the best approach would be to use a method which models both hardware and software reliability in one integrated system model. must take both This is not always 2 one, however. In some cases, only a The development of system reliability models which accurately represent the failure behavior of both hardware and software com onents of a s stem in one integrated model is a notoriously Zfficult task. The job is complicated by the fact that the failure processes of hardware and software are intrinsically different. Furthermore, the to ic of how to accurately model software reliability is itselPnot as well understood as is the topic of hardware reliability modeling, and currently there is disagreement within the field of software reliabili between hardware and software reliability modeling which contribute to the difficulty in inte rating the two of them together into one overall system reiability model. It also covers some issues that are unique to each and common to both, and lists some o en problems that need to resolved before satisfactor methoxs are likely to appear for developing integrated lardware-software system models of practical use. 
HARDWARE RELIABILITY MODELING
There are several fundamental obstacles to integrating hardware and software reliability modeling to ether. One of these is the fact that the failure processes for hardware and software are completely different in nature. This section describes the failure process and lists some typical modeling techniques for hardware. The next section will do the same for software.
Failure Process for Hardware
The failure process modeled by hardware modeling techniques is rimarily a physical degradation process. The typical lifecyie reliabili behavior of a hardware component is gram (see figure l). The diagram depicts the relative chan e in ailure rate of the component during three major phases ofthe component's life: an initial "infant mortality" burn-in period characterized by a relative1 high but decreasing failure rate during which components $at were improperly manufactured fail before their indicated design lifespan expires; a relatively stable "useful life" middle phase; and a final wear-out" phase during which the failure rate increases from increased hysical degradation due to age. During the middle "useful lire" phase, the component is assumed to have demonstrated a lack of manufacturin defects by its survival beyond the "infant mortality" perioc!? Because the component is not yet old enou h to experience age-based wear-out failures, all failures that cfo occur are assumed to be caused by stress events which occur randomly at a relatively constant rate that is determined by the hardiness of the component and to some extent by the environment in which the component operates. This paradigm fits the reliability behavior of electrical components well.
Hardware reliability modeling traditionally employs an implicit assum tion that a particular com onent is operating val). This implies the absence of both physical defects and design defects. Until recently, the assumption of absence of design defects often could be justified throu h exhaustive testing of the input-output function responses ofthe component to verify its design correctness. The initial absence of h sical defects could be justified in the same way and throug\ %urn-in" testing. These assumptions eliminate a significant proportion of the possible causes of component failure, leaving only failures due to random environmental stresses that are characterized by the failure rates of the various phases of the components lifecycle. It is unreliability due to these types of failures that traditional hardware reliability modeling tries to assess. Because of the stochastic nature of these types of failures, most quantitative hardware modeling techniques are themselves stochastic, aimed at estimatin a probability of failure over a eriod of time (mission time?. Indeed, the definition of reliabigty for hardware is usually given as the probability that a component (or system) does not experience a illustrated by the we Tr 1-known "Bathtub curve" lifecycle diacorrectly at t i e beginning of a "mission R (performance inter-failure during a specified period of time; i.e. reliability is defined as a function of time.
infant useful wearmortality 4 (burn-in)l life 1 out erarchical models [4] , and simulation [5] . Qualitative methods do not aim for a numerical estimation, but instead attempt to identify combinations or sequences of failures or events that significant1 impact s stem reliability. Examples of qualitative metho& include Gailure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs) [6] , digraphs [7] , and fault trees. Note that some methods can be used in either a uantitative or qualitative manner; specifically, FMEAs an1 fault trees fall into this category. An important simplifylng assumption of most quantitative and some qualitative methods is that individual component faiIures are statistically independent.
increasing + Component Lifetime Figure 1 : The "Bathtub Curve" Lifecycle Dia g r a m
The "Bathtub curve" lifecycle diagram provides an underlymg aradigm for the failure process of hardware. This allows Rardware failures to be modeled stochastically as responses to a sequence of environmental failure-causing stresses that occur random1 according to some probability distribution which can be claracterized by mathematical equations. The form of the mathematical equations depends on underlying assumptions U on which the model is based. For exam le, an assumption %at the component remains in its "usedlife" period throughout the period of evaluation (and hence has an essentially constant failure rate) translates into a sequence of failure events with two characteristics[l]: the number of failure events that occur within any fixed in-
where N , is a random variable denoting the number of failure-inducing stresses occurrin in the interval (O,t] , 1 denotes the constant rate at whict the stresses occur, and P ( N , = r ) denotes the probability that r stresses have occurred in the interval (O,t] .
the time between any one failure event and the next (the interarrival period) has an exponential distribution, i.e.
P ( x x ) = R (~) =~-~
, where x is a random variable denoting the time from one failure event (which occurs at time f=O) to the next, P ( x > t ) denotes the probability that the time until the next failure event is greater than t, which is equivalent to the reliability ~( t ) of the component when it is the time until the first failure event that is being evaluated.
The bottom line of this discussion is that reliability for hardware com onents can be estimated using models that: are based on a we8-defined failure rocess paradi m can be exressed in terms of mathematica7equations; ani &ich model failures stochastically (i.e. in terms of probabilities).
Modeling Methods
From the mathematical representation of the failure behavior of individual components, modeling methods exist to derive mathematical representations of the failure behavior for overall systems of many components. Most hardware reliability modeling techni ues are oriented toward either evaluating the effect of s ec&c individual component failures on the overall system kuantitative methods), or on tracing the pro agation of failures throughout the system (qualitative metkods). Quantitative methods attempt to arrive at a numerical estimate of the robabili of failure of a system or subsrtem. They incluxe methog such as fault trees [2] and relia ility block diagramstl], Markov models [3] , hybrid and hi-
SOFTWARE RELIABILITY MODELING
We now consider the failure process of software, how it differs from that of hardware, and some existing methods for modeling software reliability.
Failure Process for Software
The failure process that must be modeled for software is fundamentally different than the failure process that is traditionally modeled for hardware. The most obvious difference is that there is no physical degradation process associated with software. Instead, the failure process to be modeled in software consists entirely of an executing program encountering design defects (latent faults in the code) that cause incorrect functioning of the software. In a nutshell, traditional hardware reliability modeling assumes a complete absence of design defects and concentrates solely on failure due to physical degradation, whereas software reliability modeling has no physical degradation component at all and concentrates solely on failures due to design defects. The term fects' includes errors in the initial design, errors intFtg2:-during "bu fixes", and errors introduced when the software is enhancefto add new features.
From the "Bathtub curve" paradigm, stochastic models of the physical degradation failure process of hardware can be ormulated that are good abstractions of the relevant failure behavior and are also widely and generally applicable across a broad range of hardware component pes. However, to our knowledge there is no comparable%fecycle for software's "design defects" failure process that c z ? q a c c e ted, comprehensive, and enerally applicabl; across a broairange of software types. f h e "design defects software failure process includes aspects that are complex enou h and diverse enough that there exist no modeling methods Eat capture the effects of all of them with sufficient accuracy to be able to predict the failure behavior of a piece of software solely from its physical characteristics and development process (environment). This is a consequence of the fact that software is a product of human creative activity and fallibility. The presence or absence of desi piece of software can be influenced by sucf%ctors as: the development control rocess used (lone hacker vs. traditional structured design anBanal ysis vs. formal methods), the software architecture type ( rocedural vs. object-oriented, singlethread vs. multithread, Ecalized vs. distributed (clientserver)), the implementation lan e of program and p e of use (i.e. is it a real-time G%?%: r%yst em with ingram like dcroSoft Word(TM17 budgetary and time scgedule constraints, etc. Even the skill level and experience of individual programmers can play an important role. The mechanisms by which all of these factors influence the reliability of the software are not understood, so generally it is not known how to translate an arbitrary assumption about one of these factors into mathematical equations describing a stochastic model of the software failure process. Formulating a stochastic model that incorporates the combined effect of assumptions defects in a ependent eriodic control loo s, or is it a commercial ro about all these factors together is an even more difficult task. As a result, many of the techniques for modeling software reliabili tend to rely on assumptions covering only some asers. The practical consequence of this is that many different software modeling techniques have been develo ed, and individual modeling techniques each tend to be appEcable only to specific, relatively narrow classes of software types (e.g. software of a particular architecture, aimed at a particular a plication or category of use, developed with a specific pe modeling method is the best one for a given piece of software, and a major challenge for the software reliabili analyst has methods to a specific piece of software under analysis. Currently this must be done em irically using statistical analysis. There are several ractical Jfficulties inherent in this aproach. We will &cuss these and other problems in a folPowing section.
Software Reliability
Reliability for software is usually defined in a similar manner as that for hardware: the probability of failure-free operation of the software for a specified eriod of time in a specified environment [8] . However, $e relationshi between failure manifestation and time is different. For harxware, an operating com onent is assumed to ex erience an outside stimulus whicR causes it to fail, i.e. a ckfect is induced that did not previously exist. What is modeled stochastically is the time to the occurrence of the outside stimulus that induces the failure. However, for software there is no creation of physical defects durin operation. All defects in the software component are latent iefects which are present within the software from the time operations begin until the end of the performance period. A latent fault manifests itself when the right conditions of input data and execution sequence cause the fault to be "activated', i.e. cause an erroneous internal state in the program which then causes the rogram to deviate from its intended behavior. For software, &en, what should be modeled stochastically in order to be consistent with hardware modeling practice is the time to manifestation of any latentfaults present in the software. This is extremely difficult to do in practice. The time to manifestation of latent faults depends on at least two characteristics of the software: the number and location of the latent faults present in the software, and the frequency with which the various execution aths through the pro ram are exercised (which in turn can ge end on how the sokvare is used, by whom, and what the skiE level of the user is). We are aware of no comprehensive techniques for modelin either of these directly with high accuracy. Instead, methods 8ave been developed that attempt to model them indirectly. For example, one can attempt to characterize the number and location of latent faults by estimating a measure of failure intensity of the software (the average number of failures encountered throughout the program per unit execution time [8] ). The execution path freqlueny is essential1 what Musa[8] defines as the operationu p70 le (the set oLun types that the program can execute along with the robabilities with which they occur). The operational progle can be characterized either in terms of sets of inputs, sets of execution paths, or (more abstractly) in terms of type of user and ex ected use. Currently all of these are modeled with statisticarapproximations, and the parameter values of those models (i.e. the faiIure intensity, the operational profile probabilities, etc.) generally have a significant uncertainty associated with them.
Modeling Methods
There are three general methods of measuring software reliability, all of which depend upon software testing [9] . pects % t at influence the software failure process and not othor development process, etc.). Usually it is not obvious w 2. ich been matching the most appropriate of the availa 2 le modeling
The first, Fault Seedin [lo], is the analog for software of fault injection for harfware. It involves the artificial introduction of new faults into a pro ram before sub'ecting the ro am to a testing regmen. d e proportion olthe seeded f a u g (for which the total number is known) discovered by the testing regimen is then used as an estimate for the proportion of latent faults present in the program (for which the number discovered is known, but the total number is not known).
A second method, Sampling, involves testing the pro am with a random sample of points from its input domain tai%red to be consistent with the expected operational profile. The number of failures is then observed (no faults are removed from the software during testing), and the reliability of a single run of the program is estimated by : R = I -~, where n, is the number of failures observed, and n is the total number of runs executed during the test.
The third method, Reliabili it undergoes testing and debugging. This method appears to be the most promising for integrated software-hardware modeling because it can directly produce an estimate of failure intensity (needed to link into the hardware reliability model). The models express failure intensity with mathematical equations in terms of arameters, such as the number of faults initially present begre testing, failure intensity decrement per fault corrected, etc. There are many different models available which differ with respect to underlying assumptions about the various factors that influence the presence of faults in the software and the effect of the fault removal process employed during testing. These differing assum tions manifest themselves as differin forms of mathematicare uations, differing numbers of a n f y of parameters, wheker execution time data (time between aults) or interval data (number of faults between fixed intervals of time) are used[ll], etc. Musa[8] describes two models, a basic execution time model and a logarithmic Poisson execution time model, for which the major difference is the decrement of the failure intensity functions. Both assume failure intensity varies with time since faults can be both fixed and introduced as testing progresses. However, the failure intensity function decrement is constant in the basic model, whereas in the logarithmic Poisson model it becomes smaller with each successive failure experienced. The various assumptions give the models' predicted failure behavior different properties which, depending on the specific software, may fit the actual failure behavior well or not at all. For exam le, Musa indicates that rograms with a uniform operationay profile are better modeid with the basic model than the logarithmic Poisson model, whereas programs with non-uniform operational profiles are better modeled with the logarithmic Poisson model. This pro erty was empirically observed rather than redicted ana&tically[8], and it is not clear how the degree oroperational profile uniformity causes the per fault change in failure intensity over the testing periodto range between constant and lo arithmic decrements. This exemplifies the current need for empirical matching of model types to specific software, since it is often not yet possible to determine model-software matches directly from the characteristics of the software. n Growth Models, attem ts to characterize the change in 9 ailure intensity of the software as
INTEGRATED HARDWARE-SOFTWARE RELIA-BILITY MODELING
What is needed to be able to roduce a reliability model that integrates hardware and s o h a r e failure behavior? The foremost requirement i s to have a common concept through which hardware reliability modelin methods can be linked to software reliability modelin megods. For hardware, component failure rates derive5 from the "Bathtub curve" paradi m are used as a basis from which to develo stochastic mofeels that can estimate reliability. A comparagle concept of failure rate for software would permit integrated hardware-software models to be constructed, using many of the same modeling methods commonly used for hardware reliability modeling, in which software would be treated like any other (hardware) component. The best technique available seems to be to approximate the software failure rate using failure intensity, which in tum is estimated from data on observed failures obtained durin testing of the software. Care must be taken that the time sca?e used in the software failure intensity is consistent with the time scale used in the hardware failure rates in order to avoid distortions that can occur, for example, as a result of different processor execution speeds [8] .
The validity of the software failure intensity estimated from a reliability growth model depends heavily on how well the failure behavior of the software matches the assumptions underlying the model. In view of this, a second re uirement for developing inte rated hardware-software reli&ility models is having availaEle ways of accurately matching the most appropriate reliability growth model to any specific piece of software. In addition, an important use of reliability modeling for lifecritical embedded systems is to help com are different system architectures during the design phasegefore any system is actually built. For these types of systems, this adds a more stringent requirement of accurately erforming the software-to-reliability rowth model matcg without needing to use statistical data o%tained by testing the software under study.
Failure intensity estimates from reliabili rowth models debu ging of the software. In addition, it is wichy accepted that t8e outcome of testing de ends on the operational pro- 
ISSUES AND OPEN PROBLEMS
A second obstacle to integrated hardware-software reliability modeling lies in the fact that the field of software reliability evaluation is less mature than the field of hardware reliability evaluation. There are two ma.or reasons for this: it is a younger field than hardware reliability evaluation (b several decades), and the software failure process is arguaxly much more complex to model than the hardware failure process. A consequence of this relative immaturity is less consensus on definitions of some basic concepts and more controversy over ap roaches for measuring metrics and validating modeling teckiques for software than for hardware. This section describes some resultin unresolved issues and open problems that contribute to digiculty in developing models for software reliability, which in turn contributes to difficulty in meeting the requirements for integrated hardware-software reliability modeling outlined in the previous section.
Difficulties in the Software Reliability Field
Concepts -A major indication of immaturity in a field is a lack of agreement on some basic concepts. cabili . This is a significant problem because all software reliabxty estimation methods currently depend on some form of testing.
Software testing -The reliance of current methods for estimating software reliability metrics on testing of the software means that an inherent limitations in software testing methods can heavig impact reliability estimates. Simply put, testing of software involves executing a pro ram many times, each time with a set of input data, and otserving whether the program produces correct or incorrect behavior or output for each set of input data. The sets of input data either may be chosen randomly from the pro ram's input domain, or they may be chosen s stematically \0]. Several complications may arise as a part orthe testing process. For exam le, for each run of the program using a set of input data, a &termination must be made as to whether the program executed correctly or incorrectly. This implies the need for an "oracle" which is capable of making that determination. Depending on the funcbon of the program, such an oracle may be difficult to implement, or be costl in terms of execution time, or both[l7,18]. Secondly, the faifure behavior of the rogram can depend on the operational profile from which tge sets of input data are generated [8] . De ending on the program, obtaining accurate operational profiPes for programs can be difficult to do [18] . Finally, the effectiveness of a testing regimen to detect faults in a program is dependent on a roperty called testability, which is defined as "the probabifhy that, if a program P contains fault(s), P will fail under test[l7]." However, testability analysis is in its infancy[l7]. As a result, there are no methods currently available for accurately measuring testability. As a consequence of this, an outcome of no program failures detected during a testing regimen does not guarantee that there are no faults in the program; it only demonstrates that any faults that are present were not detected by the testing re i men. This can be an important limiting factor on the vali&y of an estimate of software reliability derived from testin data for the program. It is an important point because a i reliability estimation techniques currently available rely on testing, and hence all of them are subject to this limitation.
A final point applies in particular to life-critical software that requires very high reliability. The current state-of-the art in testing is not sufficiently advanced to be able to measure software reliability in the ultrareliability range (< t~-~ failures per hour execution time)[l9]. Some researchers are attempting to address this problem[l7].
Software reliability modeling methods -The rimary unresolved roblem is that of accurately matching tRe software with the {est reliability rowth model to get an accurate failure intensity estimate. $his is important precisely because most existing models are not broadly applicable. The various factors involved in developing software can have a potentially wide influence on the reliability of the software through mechanisms that are not understood and cannot yet be directly modeled. Conse uently, the various sets of combinations of these factors mus?be empirically matched to the available reliability rowth models. Because of difficulty in identifyin all the rzevant factors for an individual piece of software, hs em irical matchin should be performed for every program anagzed. Current6 this matching can only be done by statistically fittin observed failure data to predicted behavior of the various re7iability growth models, and painstakingly verifyin that each assumption under1 ing a candidate model is vaid for the software under ana6sis. This can onl be done effectively for software developed with a strict& controlled, well defined, and well documented develo ment process [20] . This means that no allowances are possibz for shortcuts inspired by budget and schedule constraints. This is not usually consistent with reality in actual software development as commonly practiced today.
The avionics software developed for the S ace Shuttle by IBM is an example of software that is ideagy suited to the use of reliability rowth models to estimate failure intensity (and other metric8 for use in inte rated hardware-software reliability models [20] . A well-de&ed, strictly controlled development process is used to maintain and enhance the code. A reliability growth model [21] was matched to the software and rigorously validated as accurately modeling the actual failure behavior of the software. Data on failures experienced by the software durin development and testin were used to do the validation. AI of the assumptions unferlying the model were closely examined and their applicability verified. For software that doesn't have the benefits of all of these characteristics, however, software reliabilit growth models may be of more limited use in predicting fairure intensity at points in the future. Lack of a well-defined development rocess can make validation of assum tions underlying grow& models difficult and hence make it lard to select an ap ropriate growth model. Lack of a strictly controlled deveEpment process can let excessive variation in the various fault-influencing factors prevent any one model from accurately representing the actual failure behavior of the software. Lack of an established development process and existing history of failure data can make validation of a selected rowth model difficult or im ossible. Even when an estabtshed process exists, lack of?a history of failure data (as is the case for new rojects) can make matching an appropriate reliabili grow& model to the software uncertain, especially early in %e testing and debug ing hase. This was the experience of a recent project confucte: within our research group that anal zed failure data from the flight control software for the X-&A ex erimental aircraft program during full-up system testing6'21. An attempt was made to match various software reliability growth models available in the SMERFS [23] modeling package to the flight control software at various points along the system testing schedule, duplicating what program managers might have seen had they performed the analysis as the testin schedule evolved. It was found that the small number of %ata points (failures) led to sufficiently large statistical "noise" errors during the curve fitting that none of the growth models available in SMERFS provided usable redictive estimates of future values of failure intensity, incEding the model later selected as best fitting the full set of failure data from the completed test.
For software that is to be part of a high-reliability, fault tolerant embedded system, the model matching roblem is particularly difficult. Reliability modeling for SUCK systems is often used iteratively to evaluate different candidate designs before any system is actually built. However, no history of failure data exists for a system that has not yet been completely designed or built. In this kind of situation, the best that can be achieved is to use experience gained from an earlier "sufficiently similar" system as the basis for making a model match for the new s stem "Sufficiently similar" should mean as many of the gult-influencing factors as possible should be the same in both projects. For exam le, the architecture of the software and the system shouldie very similar to the existing system for which the required histor of failure data is available, and the new system shouldVbe developed by an experienced team following a strict develo ment process that was used on the existing system and halpreviously ielded a known failure data profile. These criteria can be di8icult to meek, especially for new state-of-the-art systems that are pushing existing design envelopes.
Controversies in the Software Reliability Field
Contrasting Approaches -There are two obvious ways of reducing the number of faults in software: you can find and remove them from the finished program, or you can make sure the faults don't et into the program in the first place. The former approact is the one traditionally followed in software engineering and has been the basis for the discipline of software testing. The latter approach has been emphasized on1 relatively recently, and is the basis for usingfovmal meXods [24] in software development. The emer ence of formal methods has given rise to a controvers witkin the software community about which approach acxieves the best reliabili . Some proponents of formal methods believe that free software so that testing will no longer be required, whereas some proponents of testing reject this notion as confusing the following of rocedures with real success, and consider formal metho& as merely the latest fad in software develo ment [l6,17] . A third faction advocates a methodology caged Cleanvoom Software En ineeving [25] , which includes elements of both testing ancfformal methods and is also very controversial. In ractice, many software engineers are very reluctant to abanjon testing and rely on procedural methodology alone. However, it is reasonable to ex ect that use of formal methods can reduce the variability in &e faultinfluencing developmental factors and consequently increase the accuracy of failure intensity estimates derived from models. Formal methods may also rovide a means for achieving actual reliability that is prova!ly r a t e r , than what is measured by testing techniques[l7]. T is is likely to be a key element in validating ultrareliable software, for which current testing-based validation methods are inadequate [l9] . In view of all this, we feel that it is likely that both testing and formal methods will retain important roles in software reliability estimation.
forma ty methods are potentially capable of producing defect-
CONCLUSION
We have identified some important obstacles to developing inte rated hardware-software reliability models, especial1 wken life-critical embedded systems are involved. One ozstacle involves a fundamental difference in the nature of the failure processes of hardware and software which gives rise to metrics and modeling methods for the two that are difficult to integrate together. A second obstacle involves the relative immaturity of the field of software reliability evaluation compared to the field of hardware reliability evaluation, as evidenced by controversies and disagreements between experts in the software field over approaches and definitions of concepts needed for model integration. Software failure intensity appears to be the most promising uni ing concept for However, all current methods for estimating failure intensity rely on statistical fittin af failure data obtained during testing of the software, a n 3 the validity of results obtained from testing is itself dependent on the testability property of the linking hardware and software modeling tec tn iques together.
software, for which no accurate methods of measurement yet exist. In addition, many factors that influence the presence of faults in software do so by mechanisms that are not understood and cannot yet be modeled directly. Consequently, software failure intensity must be estimated from means such as reliability growth models, which must be empirically matched to each piece of software under analysis. That process of matching a piece of software to the growth model that most accurately represents the software's actual failure behavior is a difficult and uncertain task. This matching is particularly difficult when reliability modeling is used to comEuilt, when no failure data upon which to estimate a faikre intensity exists.
What research to ics need to be addressed to help overcome these obstacles? pn the short-intermediate term it would be are competing design options before a system is actual1
